Tornado trees

Tornado proxy

When accessing the deposit contracts using the official UI, all transactions execute through a proxy contract called the Tornado Proxy. Since the deposit contracts themselves are immutable, and many features of were added well after the original deposit contracts were deployed, the Tornado Proxy provides a way to inject additional functionality without replacing the battle-tested deposit contract instances.

The two most noteworthy functions of the Tornado Proxy are its ability to back up user deposits on-chain using encrypted note accounts, and the function which queues deposits and withdrawals for processing in the Tornado Trees contract.

Registering deposits and withdrawals

When you make a deposit through the Tornado Proxy, and when you later make a withdrawal through the same, the proxy calls corresponding methods on the Tornado Trees contract.

Registering a deposit takes the address of the deposit contract uint160, the commitment Pedersen hash bytes32, and the current block number uint, ABI encodes them, then produces a keccak256 (a.k.a. SHA3-256) hash over the resulting message. This hash is inserted into a queue within the contract, to be later batched into the deposit Merkle Tree (not to be confused with the deposit contract).

Registering a withdrawal is the essentially the same as registering a deposit, except instead of using the commitment hash, the nullifier hash of the withdrawal is used instead. The resulting keccak256 hash is inserted into the withdrawal queue, to be later batched into the withdrawal Merkle Tree.

The registerDeposit and registerWithdrawal contract methods of the Tornado Trees contract each emit a corresponding event, DepositData and WithdrawalData containing the same values as were included in the computed hash, plus an additional event field indication the order in which they entered into the queue.

Chunked Merkle Tree update

Standard Merkle Trees are fairly expensive to store and update, especially if you want to commit to a large number of leaves. Depositing a note into the deposit contracts can cost upwards of 1.2M gas, which can be hundreds of dollars worth of ETH if depositing on Ethereum mainnet. Most of this gas cost results from simply inserting a commitment into the deposit contract Merkle Tree.

What if, instead of spending all of that gas, we could instead simply propose a new Merkle Root that we computed off-chain, and prove that it's valid using a Zero Knowledge proof?

However, verifying Zero Knowledge proofs is itself quite expensive. So, instead of updating the Merkle Tree for every change, we can batch insertions together into aggregate commitments which can be verified as a whole.

Chunked tree structure

The deposit and withdrawal trees are both fixed-size Merkle Trees 20 levels deep, but with a notable feature. The "chunk size" of the tree determines a level at which updates are computed in aggregate, instead of as individual insertions.

In the case of Tornado Trees, the chunk size is 256 (2^8), so each chunk is 8 levels high. The complete tree is still limited to 2^20 leaves, but those leaves are divided into 256-leaf chunks, with a total of 2^12 chunks.

The hash function used to produce node labels is Poseidon, which is similar to the Pedersen hash function used in the core deposit contract, in that it's an elliptic curve hashing algorithm. The major difference between the two is that Poseidon operates over the BN128 elliptic curve instead of Baby Jubjub, and where Pedersen uses 1.7 constraints per bit in a ZK proof, Poseidon only uses between 0.2 and 0.45 constraints per bit.

Collecting the events

In order to compute an update to the tree, it's necessary to know the existing structure of the tree. To obtain this, you query from the contract logs the DepositData or WithdrawalData events emitted earlier, depending on which tree you're updating.

Using the index indicated by lastProcessedDepositLeaf or lastProcessedWithdrawalLeaf, you can then split the events into two sets of leaves - "committed" and "pending". As the names would imply, the former set of leaves are the ones that are already committed within the Merkle Tree, and the latter are all of the leaves which still need to be inserted.

Computing a tree update

Using the committed events, we're able to reconstruct the current state of Merkle Tree by first computing the Poseidon hash for each of the existing leaves, using the Tornado instance address, commitment/nullifier hash, and block number as the inputs to the hashing algorithm.

The empty state of the Merkle Tree starts with every leaf node labelled using a "zero value" of keccak256("tornado") % BN254_FIELD_SIZE, similarly to how zero nodes work in the core deposit circuit, except using the BN254 elliptic curve. This ensures that all paths within the tree are invalid until a valid commitment is inserted on a leaf, and gives a constant, predictable label for each node whose children are zeroes.

The leaves of the tree are then populated from left to right with the leaf hashes for the set committed events, and then the non-leaf nodes are updated up to the root. If everything is done right, the resulting root should be equal to what's currently stored in depositRoot / withdrawalRoot of the Tornado Trees contract.

Now that we have the "old root", we can proceed to take a chunk of pending events (256 of them), compute their Poseidon hashes, and insert them into the tree. After updating the non-leaf nodes up to the root, we will have the "new root".

Next, we need to collect a list of path elements starting from the subtree leaf, as well as an array of 0/1 bits indicating whether each path element is to the left or right of its parent node.

Computing the args hash

The last thing that we need before we can compute a proof is a hashed list of arguments that we'll be passing into our proving circuit, with a very particular structure.

Construct a message that is the concatenation of these fields:

  1. The old root label (32 bytes)
  2. The new root label (32 bytes)
  3. The path indices as an integer, left-padded with zeroes (4 bytes)
  4. For each event
    1. The commitment/nullifier hash (32 bytes)
    2. The Tornado instance address (20 bytes)
    3. The block number (4 bytes)

Compute the SHA-256 hash of this message, and then modulus the hash against the BN128 group modulus found in the SNARK_FIELD constant of the Tornado Trees contract.

Generating a Merkle Tree update witness

Inputs to a tree update witness

The Batch Tree Update circuit takes a single public input, which is the resulting SHA-256 args hash in the BN128 field.

The additional private inputs for a Tree Update witness are:

  1. The old root
  2. The new root
  3. The path indices as an integer, left-padded with zeroes
  4. An array of path elements
  5. For the pending events being inserted
    1. An array of commitment/nullifier hashes
    2. An array of Tornado instance addresses
    3. An array of block numbers

Prove claim

To prove that we have updated the tree correctly, we don't have to provide a proof that spans the entire tree. Instead, we can prove just that a subtree of the 8-level chunk size, with a list of specified leaves, was added in place of the left-most zero leaf of a 12-level tree.

Proving the args hash

Instead of specifying all of the inputs publicly, we can take the Args Hash that we computed earlier and compare it to the result of computing the same hash within the ZK circuit, using the private inputs. This makes for a much more efficient proof verification execution.

Build the subtree

Taking the three fields of each pending event in the order (instance, commitment/nullifier, block number), we compute the Poseidon hash of each leaf. We then construct the Merkle Tree just for the subtree that we're updating. Since the subtree is full, we don't need to worry about any zero leaves.

Verify the subtree insertion

Lastly, we verify that inserting the subtree root at the proposed position results in the old root transforming to the new root. This works essentially the same way as for the Merkle Tree Check in the core deposit circuit, except using Poseidon instead of MiMC.

The Merkle Tree Updater first verifies that the specified path contains a zero leaf by computing what the root would be given the path elements, path indices, and a zero leaf. It compares this against the specified old root, and then repeats that process again with the proposed subtree leaf, comparing the resulting root to the new root.

Completing the tree update

With the witness generated, and the proof generated from it, we can now call the corresponding updateDepositTree or updateWithdrawalTree method on the Tornado Trees contract.

We pass the update method the proof, the args hash, the old root, the new root, path indices, and a list of events that we're batch inserting. The update method then verifies that:

  1. The old root specified is the current root of the corresponding tree
  2. The specified merkle path points to the first available subtree zero leaf
  3. The specified args hash corresponds to the supplied inputs and proposed events
  4. The proof is valid according to the circuit verifier, using the args hash as public input

If these preconditions are met, then each inserted event is deleted from the queue. The corresponding contract fields indicating the current and previous roots are updated, as well as a pointer to the last event leaf.

There is a special branch of logic in this method which also handles migrating events from the Tornado Trees V1 contract. After the initial migration, these paths are never visited, and can be safely ignored.

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